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SELLING STOCK AND SELLING LEGAL CLAIMS: 
ALIENABILITY AS A CONSTRAINT 
ON MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM 
CHARLES R. KORSMO* 
Abstract 
Scholars have long recognized the importance of market forces as a tool 
for disciplining the management of public corporations and reducing 
agency costs. If managers loot or otherwise mismanage the firm, the firm’s 
stock price will suffer, raising its cost of capital and leaving managers 
exposed to the threat of a hostile takeover. In recent decades, changing 
patterns of stock ownership have threatened the viability of this market 
check on mismanagement. Institutional investors, and particularly index 
funds, own an increasing portion of publicly traded firms, and face 
substantial liquidity and other barriers to simply selling their positions. To 
the extent this phenomenon attenuates market reactions to mismanagement, 
stockholders will have to look elsewhere for protection.  
More fundamentally, market discipline cannot effectively deter 
wrongdoing in final period transactions like mergers. Stockholders must 
look to legal remedies—such as fiduciary duty class actions or appraisal 
proceedings—for deterrence against managerial sloth or opportunism in 
connection with mergers. Historically, though, these remedies have been 
rendered ineffective by an agency problem (between stockholders and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys) every bit as problematic as the one (between 
stockholders and management) the remedies are intended to address. 
Recently, however, a new market has arisen with the potential to render 
these remedies more effective. If, instead of selling their shares, 
stockholders can sell their legal claims—as they are beginning to do in 
appraisal actions—agency costs in merger litigation can be reduced and 
managerial opportunism more effectively deterred. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. My thanks to 
the participants in the 2016 Oklahoma Law Review Symposium. I am a principal of Stermax 
Partners, which provides compensated advice on stockholder appraisal and manages 
appraisal-related investments, and have economic interests in the outcome of appraisal 
proceedings. I received no compensation for the preparation of this article, and none of the 
views expressed here were developed directly out of my advisory work, although general 
experience of course serves as helpful background. 
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When a stockholder in a public company is dissatisfied with how the 
company is being managed, the classic response is for her to simply sell her 
shares. So classic is this response that it has come to be known as the “Wall 
Street Rule”—unhappy investors should not get involved; they should get 
out.1 While the reluctance of major stockholders to get involved in 
management is often lamented, in practice the ability of stockholders to 
easily sell their shares in a reasonably efficient market provides excellent 
protection against mismanagement. If a company’s managers serve 
stockholders poorly—whether as a result of incompetence, sloth, or 
disloyalty—the company’s stock price will suffer, putting the firm at a 
competitive disadvantage and exposing management to the prospect of a 
takeover.2 The mere existence of a market for stock thus serves to alleviate 
the agency problem that inevitably arises from the separation of ownership 
and control that characterizes the modern public company.3 The apparent 
effectiveness of market discipline is one of the primary justifications for the 
largely “hands off,” enabling nature of corporate law. 
In recent decades, however, the rise of institutional shareholding has led 
some to question whether this market discipline will continue to be 
effective. Today, a relatively small number of large institutions own the 
majority of the shares in most large public companies.4 The concern is that 
large institutional investors will find it impractical to liquidate their large 
positions, and will thus be unable to simply sell in the face of 
mismanagement. The concern is particularly acute for index funds, which 
make up an increasing percentage of institutional stockholders. Not only do 
such funds face liquidity constraints, but by their very nature they do not 
seek to identify mispriced securities in the first place. If the increasing 
dominance of such funds reduces the market’s ability to detect and price 
mismanagement, the disciplining effects of the market will also be reduced. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Louis Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stick and a Carrot, 7 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 251, 251 (1988) (“The Wall Street Rule, which has been immutable 
for as long as any of us can remember, dictates that shareholders not take an active role in 
corporate affairs. Love’em or leave’em.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and 
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275 (1977). 
 3. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 281-87, 289-99, 352-57 (1932). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II. 
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These concerns are ill-founded. Market efficiency does not require all 
investors, or even most investors, to be actively engaged in attempting to 
price securities. To the extent increased holdings by some types of 
institutional investors renders markets less efficient, the resulting 
inefficiency will represent a profit opportunity for other sophisticated 
investors. Any disequilibrium created by changing patterns of shareholding 
is likely to be self-correcting. 
The more serious shortcoming of market discipline is that it is unlikely to 
be effective in final period transactions.5 The most common final period 
transaction for corporate managers is a merger. Following a merger, the 
target company will typically have no immediate exposure to either the 
capital markets or the market for corporate control. The target company’s 
managers will be wholly immune to market discipline, whatever their sins 
of omission or commission in arranging the merger. The law has long 
recognized that market discipline will be inadequate in merger scenarios. 
Delaware law, for example, provides for more searching scrutiny in 
fiduciary duty class actions involving such transactions, at least in theory.6 
In practice, however, fiduciary duty class actions have been ineffective in 
policing agency problems inside the corporation, because they have been 
crippled by agency problems outside the corporation—namely, between the 
dispersed stockholders who own the legal claims and the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who control them. 
Even here, however, the stockholder’s right to sell offers a potential 
solution. After a merger has been announced, it is too late for a stockholder 
to sell her shares and be protected—whatever harm has been done will 
already be reflected in the stock price.7 It need not, however, be too late for 
the stockholder to sell her legal claims. A specialist aggregator of legal 
claims could buy up claims and prosecute them more effectively than 
dispersed stockholders, in particular by better monitoring the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and curtailing the agency problems that have rendered merger 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3277, 3291 (2013). 
 6. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 7. See Jeff Goetz, A Dissent Dampened by Timing: How the Stock Market Exception 
Systematically Deprives Public Shareholders of Fair Value, 15 FORDHAM J CORP. & FIN. L. 
771, 794 (“[S]ince most shareholders that might wish to dissent from the transaction learn 
about the transaction when the rest of the market does—at the time of public 
announcement—they can only sell their shares after that announcement . . . . Consequently, 
dissenting shareholders will only be able to sell their interests in the company after the 
merger’s value has become incorporated into the company’s share price.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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litigation ineffectual. The ability to sell to such an aggregator would 
provide injured stockholders with compensation for injuries due to 
managerial opportunism and, more importantly, help deter such 
wrongdoing in the first place. A back-end market in legal claims promises 
to provide at least some of the discipline that the front-end market for 
securities cannot provide in the merger context. 
The nascent market for appraisal rights offers a glimpse of this promise. 
Appraisal statutes give a stockholder the right to dissent from some forms 
of merger transactions, refusing the merger consideration and instead 
requesting a court declare the “fair value” of her shares.8 Crucially, a 
stockholder can preserve appraisal rights even if she buys her shares after a 
transaction has already been announced. Effectively, this means that 
existing stockholders can sell their appraisal rights to aggregators known as 
appraisal arbitrageurs. Although a relatively new phenomenon, the 
available evidence so far suggests that so-called “appraisal arbitrage” is not 
characterized by the same pathologies that plague the traditional merger 
class action, and serves as a better tool of enforcement of the substantive 
law. To the extent the market forces driving appraisal arbitrage can be 
introduced to the fiduciary duty class action, it, too, could function as a 
more effective check on managerial incompetence and opportunism. The 
right to sell claims could at least partially fill the role for final period 
transactions that the right to sell stock serves in the ordinary course. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief explanation of 
how stockholders’ ability to sell their shares can deter mismanagement. Part 
II considers the risk that increasing institutional ownership of public 
companies will dilute deterrence, and concludes that the risk is small. Part 
III explains how the ability to sell shares fails to deter managerial 
opportunism in final period decisions like mergers, and briefly introduces 
the traditional legal mechanisms addressed to the problem. Part IV explains 
how the right to sell legal claims could address managerial opportunism in 
final period transactions, and gives the real-world example of appraisal 
arbitrage. 
I. The Right to Sell Stock as a Constraint on Mismanagement 
One of the defining characteristics of the modern public corporation is 
the separation of ownership and control.9 The stockholders own the 
corporation, while the managers—directors and officers—control it. As in 
                                                                                                                 
 8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011). 
 9. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 3, at 119-25. 
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any situation where one person is given control of assets for the benefit of 
another, this arrangement leads to a pervasive agency problem. If the 
interests of the managers and the stockholders are not perfectly aligned 
(which they never are), there is a risk managers will pursue their own 
interests at the expense of the interests of the stockholders.10 This 
managerial opportunism—which can be lumped under the catch-all term 
“shirking”—can take many forms, ranging from indifferent and slothful 
performance of one’s assigned tasks, to over-consumption of perquisites, to 
outright stealing.11 
The agency problem at the heart of the public corporation is hardly a 
secret. The total amount lost to agency costs—including the amounts spent 
attempting to reduce shirking monitoring or bonding mechanisms—
threatens to be exceedingly large. This is especially so, given that 
stockholders are unlikely to be effective in monitoring for mismanagement. 
Even if an individual stockholder possessed the expertise and resources to 
effectively monitor management, he would recoup only a very small 
portion of every dollar spent doing so. This collective action problem gives 
each stockholder an incentive to remain passive, hoping to free-ride on the 
monitoring efforts of other stockholders.12 
Reducing agency costs is one plausible role for corporate law. For the 
most part, however, corporate law has not taken up this challenge. 
Delaware, home to the majority of public companies, has a corporate code 
that is almost exclusively enabling rather than regulatory in nature, and 
other states have largely followed suit.13 Furthermore, judicial review of 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1169-70 (1981) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role] (“Corporate managers (which include 
both officers and members of the board), like all other people, work harder if they can enjoy 
all of the benefits of their efforts. In a corporation, however, much of the benefit of each 
manager’s performance inures to someone else, whether it be shareholders, bondholders, or 
other managers.”). 
 11. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract] 
(“[M]anagers can divert income to themselves, stealing and mismanaging at the same time. 
Diversion and sloth may be subtle, but they exist.”). 
 12. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 10, at 1171 (“Because 
other shareholders take a free ride on any one shareholder’s monitoring, each shareholder 
finds it in his self-interest to be passive.”). 
 13. See Winter, supra note 2, at 252 (“[M]ost state corporation laws are ‘enabling’ 
rather than regulatory. That is, they ‘enable’ private parties to accomplish incorporation on 
terms which they freely choose. As a result, state laws do not impose extensive mandatory 
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alleged mismanagement—as embodied by the Business Judgment Rule—is 
deferential almost to the point of non-existence.14 By the 1970s, the 
seeming helplessness and vulnerability of stockholders had led to sustained 
calls for greater substantive regulation of corporate managers, whether in 
the form of federally enacted mandatory governance rules, or greater 
judicial scrutiny of alleged mismanagement, or both. 
The picture of investor helplessness, however, was highly incomplete, in 
that it ignored the powerful constraints placed on management by the 
ability of stockholders to sell their shares. As Albert O. Hirschman 
famously suggested, members of an organization typically face a choice 
between “exit” and “voice.”15 Consider a social club where membership is 
generally highly desirable, but which has a policy—say, no alcohol on 
Sundays—some of the members find objectionable. If the social club is the 
only one in town, the dissatisfied members have a strong incentive to get 
involved—to exercise “voice”—in trying to get the policy changed. 
Imagine, however, there is another club across the street, identical in all 
respects except that it also serves alcohol on Sundays. Members who do not 
like their club’s policy can exercise their ability to “exit” and simply cross 
the street. If the clubs are dependent on their members for revenue, they 
will be forced to compete with each other to adopt policies that members 
will find congenial. Importantly, even if the members have no formal say in 
how the clubs are run, their ability to exit will create a powerful incentive 
for the clubs to adopt policies that will attract members. 
Stockholders in publicly traded companies can exit with extreme ease. If 
they are dissatisfied with one investment, they have thousands of near-
perfect substitutes available to them.16 In any reasonably efficient market, 
the ease with which stockholders can exit their investment puts a powerful 
constraint on mismanagement.17 A company that is badly managed—
                                                                                                                 
restrictions upon the discretion of corporate management, although such restrictions may be 
written into a corporate charter.”). 
 14. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 100-02 (2004).  
 15. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 16. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 17. This argument was most famously made by Ralph K. Winter, Jr. in 1977. Winter 
argued that firms whose managers profited at the expense of stockholders “must be less than 
earnings of comparable corporations” whose management was faithful, placing them “at a 
disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital,” with the ultimate result being that “their share 
price will decline, thereby creating a threat of a takeover which may replace management.” 
Winter, supra note 2, at 256.  
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whether due to disloyalty, incompetence, or otherwise—will produce lower 
earnings than it otherwise would. As a result, investors will be willing to 
pay less for the company’s securities, and the stock price will decline.18 As 
a result, the company will face a higher cost of capital and be at a 
disadvantage competing against other, better-managed firms. Even where 
the company does not need to raise additional capital by issuing new 
securities, a depressed stock price will expose managers to the prospect of 
being ejected in a takeover. A mismanaged company offers a juicy profit 
opportunity. If the company’s stock is worth substantially less than it would 
be under different management, a takeover specialist can take over the firm 
at a discount and profit by installing better managers.19 As Professor 
Fischel and Judge Easterbrook put it in an influential 1989 article: 
“Managers may do their best to take advantage of their investors, but they 
find that the dynamics of the market drive them to act as if they had 
investors’ interests at heart. It is almost as if there were an invisible 
hand.”20 
Of course, the “invisible hand” is not almighty. Its power to discipline 
management is limited to the extent the takeover market is inefficient, and 
to the extent that the securities markets themselves are inefficient in pricing 
mismanagement. This suggests that regulatory corporate law may still have 
a beneficial role to play, though the benefits of restrictions on management 
discretion would need to be weighed against the costs.21 In practice, 
however, the stockholders’ right to sell is a powerful protective mechanism 
and is sufficient to forestall any broad move toward a more regulatory 
corporate law.22  
                                                                                                                 
 18. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 11, at 1419 (“If 
managers promise to return but a pittance, the investors will not put up very much money. 
The investors simply pay less for the paper the firms issue. There is therefore a limit on 
managers’ efforts to enrich themselves at investors’ expense.”). 
 19. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role, supra note 10, at 1173 (“Prospective 
bidders monitor the performance of managerial teams by comparing a corporation’s 
potential value with its value (as reflected by share prices) under current management. When 
the difference between the market price of a firm’s shares and the price those shares might 
have under different circumstances becomes too great, an outsider can profit by buying the 
firm and improving its management.”); see also Manne, supra note 2, at 113. 
 20. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 11, at 1419. 
 21. See generally Winter, supra note 2, at 258-62 (discussing “[t]he costs and benefits 
of restricting management discretion” and criticizing proponents of greater regulation for 
“either assum[ing] that no costs will fall upon shareholders or merely undertak[ing] a 
cursory ‘eyeballing’ of the potential costs”). 
 22. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3291 (“The law is able to defer to most director 
decisions because agency costs are adequately constrained by market and other extralegal 
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II. The Rise of Institutional Shareholding as a Threat to the Right to Sell 
Recent decades have seen a dramatic shift in patterns of stock ownership. 
Fifty years ago, individual households owned approximately 85% of public 
company stock. The 1970s and 1980s saw a dramatic surge in institutional 
ownership which, after a pause in the early 1990s, resumed in the 2000s. At 
present, institutions hold approximately 70-80% of U.S. corporate equity, 
with the largest amounts held by mutual funds and pension funds.23 A 
smaller—but rapidly growing—share is held by so-called “exchange-traded 
funds” (“ETFs”).24 As the name suggests, ETFs are investment funds that 
issue shares that are traded on public exchanges. Most ETFs are index 
funds that simply attempt to track the performance of some index—such as 
the S&P 500—by holding a weighted portfolio of the index securities.25 
The increasing dominance of institutional stockholders could, in theory, 
cause market discipline to lose some of its force. Institutional investors are, 
in many cases, less able to exercise their right to sell because—with their 
large holdings—they are more constrained in their ability to sell by limits 
on liquidity.26 This loss of liquidity could conceivably be offset by an 
                                                                                                                 
forces.”). For general analyses of the effects of selling shares on corporate governance, see 
Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes Around 
Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2003); Anat R. Admati & Paul C. Pfleiderer, The 
‘Wall Street Walk’ and Shareholder Activism: Exist as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2445 (2009).  
 23. See Jose Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 1 (Ross School 
of Business Paper No. 1235, Mar. 15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2427345); Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations 
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long 
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10-11 (2010). 
 24. See William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A 
Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69 (2008). 
 25. See Actively Managed Exchange-Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 25258, 66 Fed. Reg. 57614 (Nov. 15, 2001). 
 26. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288–89 (1991) (suggesting that “‘exit’ has 
become more difficult, because institutional investors, who increasingly own large 
unmarketable blocks, must accept substantial price discounts in order to liquidate these 
blocks.”); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 572-
73 (1990) (“Large institutions are increasingly abandoning the ‘exit’ alternative to voice—
the ‘Wall Street Rule’ that investors should sell their stock if they don’t like the managers. 
They’re too big to sell large portions of their portfolio, and know it.”); see also Ira M. 
Millstein, On the Making of Pension Funds as ‘Patient Capitalists,’ DIRECTORS & BOARDS, 
Winter 1990, at 15 (concluding that pension funds “cannot dispose of large blocks of stock 
easily”). 
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increasing resort to “voice,” but given the weakness of traditional 
mechanisms of stockholder control, the substitution would be partial at best. 
Moreover, institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds 
are increasingly eschewing “active” money management. Instead of trying 
to beat the market by identifying mispriced securities, they are increasingly 
assuming that the market is efficient and seeking to piggy-back on that 
efficiency by simply creating a low-cost, well-diversified portfolio. In 
doing so, money managers are belatedly bending to a half-century of 
academic research showing that active management does not create any 
value for investors, after factoring in fees and expenses.27  
ETFs represent the logical extreme of this passive strategy, explicitly 
aiming to replicate some broad market index and making no pretense at 
valuing individual stocks. At the limit, if the entire market were made up of 
ETFs, nobody would actively seek to price securities and the market would 
lose the very efficiency that makes ETFs work in the first place.28 Relevant 
to the issues at hand, the disciplining effect of the right to sell described in 
Part II arose out of the assumption that the shares of mismanaged 
companies would trade at a discount. That is, the market can only deter 
managerial opportunism if it can detect and price mismanagement. Market 
discipline can only serve as a constraint on mismanagement if the market is 
reasonably efficient. 
Concerns that increasing institutional shareholding will impair market 
efficiency, however, are overblown. Inaccurate market prices represent a 
profit opportunity. If some institutional investors cease to identify and 
discount prices for mismanagement, outsized profits will be available for 
other sophisticated investors who do. Just as prices cannot remain perfectly 
accurate without destroying the profit incentives that create accuracy in the 
first place, they also cannot stray too far from accuracy without attracting 
arbitrageurs who would profit from the inaccuracy.29 What prevails is an 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-
Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915 (2010); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from 
Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN. 549 (1995).  
 28. See Coffee, supra note 26, at 1340 (“If all, or nearly all, institutional investors were to 
adopt passive trading strategies, there would simply be no market—or at least not an efficient 
one.”). Even Nobel Prize-winning economist William Sharpe, who has a claim to being the 
father of index investing, has worried in interviews that the increasing dominance of passive 
investing could reduce market efficiency. See Mark Dowie, The Best Investment Advice You’ll 
Never Get, S.F. MAG. (Jan. 18, 2008) (claiming that Sharpe “believes we’d even start to see a 
decline in market efficiency if index funds rose to 50 percent of total investments”), 
http://www.modernluxury.com/san-francisco/story/the-best-investment-advice-youll-never-get. 
 29. John Coffee puts it as follows:  
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equilibrium level of disequilibrium, where an additional dollar spent 
detecting and correcting inaccurate prices would yield a dollar in profits.30 
Even a very small proportion of active investors can be sufficient to 
maintain the price efficiency necessary to discipline mismanagement. As a 
result, stockholders have little to fear from the growth of institutional 
shareholding.31 
III. Final Period Decisions and the Limits of the Right 
to Sell as Stockholder Protection 
Though stockholders have little to fear from the rise of institutional 
shareholding, the right to sell shares is not a panacea against managerial 
wrongdoing. In particular, market discipline is only effective to the extent 
that managers are exposed to the market on an ongoing basis.32 As a result, 
the right to sell can provide little protection against managerial opportunism 
                                                                                                                 
Economic theory suggests that if indexed investing were to become the 
predominant strategy for institutions, other investors would be enabled to 
pursue more profitable trading strategies. Thus, there seems considerable 
reason to believe that institutional investors will divide along a continuum 
whose poles are represented by (1) indexed investors . . . and (2) active traders 
who may find that the growth of indexed trading increases the opportunities 
available for profitable short-term trading.  
Coffee, supra note 26, at 1340 (footnote omitted). 
 30. See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980) (explaining that 
markets must retain an equilibrium level of disequilibrium because markets cannot remain 
efficient without an incentive to seek out new information to correct mispricings). See 
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
 31. That is not to say that the increasing dominance of institutional shareholding is 
entirely unproblematic. It has been persuasively argued, for example, that substantial cross-
holdings by institutional investors can be expected to lead to anti-competitive effects. 
Consider, for example, if the same handful of institutional investors owns 50% of the shares 
of all of the major airlines. Those investors would prefer that the airlines refrain from 
competing and instead engage in price-fixing and other anti-competitive behaviors that 
would increase profits at the expense of consumer surplus, and may use their influence to 
encourage management to pursue such a course. See generally Einer Elhauge, Horizontal 
Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016). This phenomenon, however, would not be a 
manifestation of the corporate agency problem. It would actually be a product of corporate 
managers being faithful to the interests of stockholders, to the detriment of consumers and 
the broader economy. 
 32. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3292 (“In repeat game settings, the actors’ 
decisions are constrained by the threat that cheating in one turn will be punished by the other 
party in future turns.”). 
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in final period decisions. The most important type of final period decision is 
a merger in which the company is acquired.33 Managers can improperly 
divert benefits to themselves in a merger—in the form of large change-of-
control payments, continued employment contracts, participation in the 
buy-out at sweetheart prices, etc.—without fear of any market sanction. 
Stockholders’ right to sell provides no deterrence. 
A. Legal Protections and the Failure of the Merger Class Action 
Delaware law recognizes the acute conflict of interest in merger 
transactions and the inadequacy of market deterrence. In response, 
Delaware courts have attempted—in Unocal, Revlon, and their progeny—to 
protect stockholders by employing a more searching standard of review in 
merger cases.34 In place of the typical, highly deferential, Business 
Judgment Rule standard of review, the Delaware courts have crafted what 
has been called an “intermediate” or “enhanced business judgment” 
standard of review in takeover cases.35 In theory, this more searching 
judicial review of management actions in the merger context promises to 
deter wrongdoing and reduce agency costs where the right to sell cannot.  
In practice, however, the merger class action has been a major 
disappointment. In fact, merger class actions suffer from an agency problem 
of their own, between the stockholders and the plaintiffs’ attorneys.36 
Despite the availability of a contingency fee, the incentives of the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys often diverge sharply from those of the stockholders in at least 
three ways. First, because it costs little to file a claim and they lack any 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See id. (“In contrast [to operational decisions in an ongoing enterprise], structural 
decisions—such as corporate takeovers—present a final period problem entailing an 
especially severe conflict of interest.”). 
 34. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. 
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 186 (Del. 1986). Unocal and 
Revlon essentially dealt with the flip-sides of the conflict of interest in merger transactions. 
Unocal involved the defensive efforts managers may take to stave off a takeover, 493 A.2d 
at 955, thus thwarting the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control discussed in 
Part II. Revlon involved the duties of management in a merger scenario to secure the best 
deal for stockholders, as opposed to diverting value to themselves. 506 A.2d at 185. 
 35. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW, 547 (1995). 
Professor Bainbridge has called the Unocal/Revlon approach a “conditional business 
judgment rule,” in that it requires boards to demonstrate good faith and reasonable grounds 
for their judgments before the court will ultimately defer to those judgments. See 
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 3294-300. 
 36. See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder 
Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 840-43 (2014) [hereinafter 
Korsmo & Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation]. 
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interest in the enterprise being sued, plaintiffs’ attorneys have little 
incentive to avoid bringing low-quality claims in an attempt to settle them 
for nuisance value. Second, because the plaintiffs’ attorneys are unlikely to 
be fully “diversified,” they tend to be risk-averse, willing to settle even 
strong cases quickly.37 Third, and perhaps most seriously, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys “have every incentive to maximize the portion of the economic 
value of a settlement going to [themselves], even at the expense of the 
shareholders.”38 Meanwhile stockholder efforts to monitor the attorneys are 
hampered by the same collective action problems that arise in the corporate 
governance context. The attorneys will virtually always have a financial 
stake in the claims that dwarfs that of any individual stockholder in a 
widely held public company. 
The result for many years was that almost every merger of any size faced 
a fiduciary duty class action, with the vast majority settling quickly for 
supplemental disclosures of dubious value—and, of course, generous 
attorney’s fees.39 Following several years of outcry, the Delaware courts 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (noting that “plaintiff’s class and derivative attorneys 
function essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk”); 
James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) 
(explaining that “a settlement offer that provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and 
opportunity costs could loom larger than the prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to 
a more lucrative prospective judgment or settlement”). 
 38. Korsmo & Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 36, at 842; 
Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of Representative Litigation, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 152, 155 (Claire A. Hill & 
Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (“[I]f suits were being driven too much by lawyer interests, 
representative litigation could result in the attorney initiating suits with too little merit, 
settling strong suits for too little, and structuring the settlement so the costs are not borne by 
the actual wrongdoers.”); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of 
Representative Shareholder Suits and Its Application to Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation, 106 
NW. L. REV. 1753, 1762 (2012) (“Shareholder suits under both state and national law are 
most frequently representative, meaning that the typical case involves one named plaintiff 
and, importantly, one or more law firms for that prospective representative seeking to speak 
for a large body of shareholders. This can lead to litigation agency costs, for example, if 
agents bring what are perceived as strike suits or settle meritorious suits too cheaply.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 39. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for 
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 557 (2014) (“Shareholder litigation challenging corporate 
mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of 
this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing 
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responded in two ways. First, in October 2015, the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Corwin held that a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the majority 
of disinterested stockholders would result in a post-merger damages action 
being reviewed under the deferential Business Judgment Rule standard 
rather than the usual Revlon standard.40 Second, in the January 2016 Trulia 
opinion, the Court of Chancery held that merger class action settlements 
would be rejected unless they provided a “plainly material” benefit to 
stockholders.41 The result has been a sharp drop in Delaware merger class 
action filings in 2016.42 
Although Corwin and Trulia have probably worked to reduce the volume 
of nuisance litigation in Delaware, they can do little to address the more 
pernicious problem of quick, cheap settlement of meritorious actions. 
Indeed, Corwin may work to make it more difficult for even meritorious 
suits to succeed by allowing what amounts to a Hobson’s choice to insulate 
a merger from judicial scrutiny. The result is that traditional judicial 
remedies do little to make up for the lack of market discipline in final 
period transactions such as mergers. 
B. The Right to Sell Cannot Provide Compensation for Already Completed 
Mismanagement 
It is worth mentioning that although the right to sell provides deterrence 
against mismanagement, it cannot actually provide stockholders with 
compensation for mismanagement that already occurred. Assume, for 
example, the CEO of a public company steals or otherwise destroys $100 
million in value through her mismanagement. If the market is reasonably 
efficient, the stock price will go down to reflect the destruction in value as 
soon as it is publicly known. By then, however, it is too late for a 
stockholder to sell her shares to escape the consequences of the CEO’s 
actions—the horse has already left the barn. The same is true in the case of 
an abusive merger. If management announces that it has agreed to a merger 
                                                                                                                 
more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring 
these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee.”). 
 40. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-14 (Del. 2015). 
 41. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 42. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS OF 
PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF 2015 AND 1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION, 1 (2016) (finding that 
the percentage of challenged deals fell from more than 90% to 64% in the first half of 2016). 
Early evidence suggests, however, that much of the drop is a result of suits migrating out of 
Delaware to other jurisdictions. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: 
Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in 
THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (forthcoming 2017). 
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for inadequate consideration, the relevant stock’s trading price will 
immediately reflect the inevitability of the merger price unless it is clear the 
transaction is unlikely to be approved. A dissatisfied stockholder’s right to 
sell does not offer a “safety valve” allowing her to escape the merger’s 
consequences.  
This predicament may seem obvious, but Delaware law occasionally 
appears not to appreciate it. For example, Delaware’s appraisal statute 
contains a so-called “market out” exception, making appraisal unavailable 
when the merger consideration is entirely in the form of marketable 
securities.43 Some commentators defend this exception on the grounds that 
any stockholder dissatisfied with the securities offered as merger 
consideration can simply sell them.44 Similarly, in the class action context, 
a series of cases hold that heightened Revlon scrutiny is not available if a 
high enough percentage of the merger consideration is in the form of 
stock.45 The distinction, however, makes no sense. If the merger 
consideration is inadequate, it is inadequate, whatever form it may come in. 
The fact that market securities can be valued and sold easily is irrelevant—
nothing, after all, is easier to value and sell than cash.46 
                                                                                                                 
 43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (2011). 
 44. See JEFFREY HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE 90 (2014) (“The market-out exception 
recognizes that the market is superior to a judge when it comes to fairly valuing the shares of 
dissenting public stockholders. If those stockholders are to receive stock as merger 
consideration, the market-out exception encourages them to simply cash out before the 
merger is consummated by selling their shares in the open market. When dissenting public 
stockholders are forced to receive cash as merger consideration, by contrast, the market may 
not provide a fair valuation.”). 
 45. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989); 
In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at 
*12 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011); QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Commc’n, Inc., 635 A.2d 
1245, 1266-67 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
 46. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 
41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 332 (2016) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern 
Appraisal Litigation] (“A target stockholder might feel shortchanged not because she is 
getting stock . . . but because she is not getting enough of it. Just as easily as they could be 
underpaid in cash, target stockholders could be underpaid in stock of Exxon Mobil or in 
postage stamps or in anything else, for that matter.”). Vice Chancellor Travis Laster has 
made the same point in the Revlon context. J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: 
Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 39-40 (2013) 
(“Negotiated acquisitions are bargaining situations. Value is not conferred charitably on sell-
side stockholders; it must be extracted. . . . In a cash deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of 
a higher dollar figure. In a stock deal, the gain-sharing takes the form of a larger share of the 
post-transaction entity. In either case, the gains are allocated through negotiation.”).  
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The inability of the right to sell is not particularly important in many 
circumstances, where deterring managerial wrongdoing is the far more 
salient public policy goal. In the merger context, however—where market 
deterrence is not available—compensation may be all that can be hoped for. 
Moreover, if the compensation is paid by the responsible managers (directly 
or indirectly) via a judicial proceeding, the prospect of compensation can 
also serve a deterrence function.  
IV. The Right to Sell Legal Claims as a Constraint on Mismanagement 
As Part III explains, the right to sell one’s shares serves as little 
protection in final period scenarios like mergers. Even where the right to 
sell shares is unhelpful, however, the right to sell legal claims offers 
potentially real protection. In particular, the right to sell legal claims to a 
specialist aggregator offers a potential mechanism for overcoming the 
agency problems that render merger litigation ineffective.47 
The class action mechanism overcomes two fundamental problems. First, 
and most obviously, it economizes on judicial resources by avoiding 
duplicative litigation of common questions of law and fact. Second, it 
overcomes collective action problems. In a stockholder suit, for example, a 
large number of individual stockholders may have suffered harms that are 
smaller than the cost of bringing and winning a lawsuit. As a result, it is not 
in the interest of any one stockholder to bring a claim, and the injured 
parties will go uncompensated (and the wrongdoers will go undeterred). 
The class action mechanism aggregates these claims into a single action, 
potentially turning what would be a large mass of negative-value claims—if 
each had to be litigated separately—into a single positive-value claim.48  
As shown in Part III, unfortunately, the class action has failed to live up 
to its promise in the merger context. To the extent legal claims can be 
bought and sold, however, specialist financiers could accomplish a similar 
                                                                                                                 
 47. For an extended treatment of the idea introduced in this part, see generally Charles 
R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing Class Actions with a 
Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323 (2016) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, 
Aggregation by Acquisition].  
 48. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Commentary on the Limits of Compensation and 
Deterrence in Legal Remedies, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 73 (1997) (“[T]he class 
action is the preeminent innovation allowing the compensatory goal to serve the deterrent 
function more effectively.”); Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: 
The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 299, 299 (1980) (noting that the class damage action has been “hailed by some as the 
most important procedural innovation of this century”).  
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aggregation of claims simply by buying them from their original owners: 
aggregation by acquisition. Doing so would solve the same problems as 
procedural aggregation—avoiding duplicative litigation and transforming 
multiple negative-value claims into one positive-value claim—but would do 
so without creating a vicious agency problem. The buyer—unlike the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in a class action—would actually own the claims as 
well as control them. 
In the context of stockholder litigation, claims could be bought and sold 
simply by buying and selling the relevant stock. For some types of 
stockholder claims, this would likely be unwieldy, in that an aggregator 
buying a company’s stock to pursue a legal claim would also be exposed to 
the risk of owning the company.49 Fortunately, this problem is not much of 
an obstacle in merger litigation, where the company is disappearing and the 
primary issue of concern to a claim-purchaser would simply be the 
adequacy of the merger consideration. As explained above, in non-merger 
situations, where the company will continue as a public enterprise, market 
discipline functions as an effective constraint on mismanagement. There is 
little need for effective legal constraints, and claim aggregation would be 
superfluous. That is, aggregation by acquisition is particularly practicable in 
the merger context, precisely where it is most needed. 
A. The Benefits of a Market for Merger Claims 
A market for merger claims would have several potential benefits. Most 
obviously, it would greatly alleviate the agency problems that plague 
merger class actions. Unlike dispersed stockholders, a specialist aggregator 
would have both the ability and the incentive to monitor her attorneys and 
supervise the litigation. By itself, this promises to greatly reduce the 
incidence of quick settlements unrelated to the merits of the underlying suit, 
where the lawyers are the only real beneficiaries.  
Partly as a consequence, harmed stockholders would receive better 
compensation. Claim aggregators would be able to assemble a portfolio of 
claims, rendering them essentially risk-neutral and better able to bear the 
risk of trial or hold out for a settlement reflecting the true expected value of 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition, supra note 47, at 1358 (“An 
aggregator seeking, for example, to assemble a large position to sue Apple directors’ breach 
of fiduciary duty, would also have exposed themselves to the risk of simply holding Apple’s 
shares. The aggregator, presumably, would be in the business of evaluating and enforcing 
legal rights, not evaluating makers of laptops and portable telephones. This undesired risk 
may be expensive or impossible to fully hedge.”). 
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the claim.50 As a repeat player, an aggregator would also be able to develop 
specialized expertise and economies of scale in litigating claims. In a 
competitive market for valuable legal claims, aggregators bidding for shares 
would result in stockholders receiving the bulk of the additional value a 
claim gains in the hands of an aggregator.51 
Finally, claims aggregated by purchase are less likely to be brought for 
nuisance value. A plaintiffs’ attorney utilizing procedural aggregation (a 
class action) has every incentive to bring a nuisance claim. Doing so is 
virtually costless—a small filing fee and the opportunity cost of her time. 
By contrast, a plaintiff who has had to aggregate by purchasing stock will 
have substantial out-of-pocket expenses at the outset, and consequently real 
risk if the claim turns out not to be meritorious. Given the real costs an 
aggregator faces in pursuing a claim, nuisance suits would be largely self-
deterring in the absence of a credible threat of achieving a successful result 
at trial. 
Most importantly, more accurate compensation and fewer nuisance suits 
would also result in better deterrence of mismanagement in the first place.52 
The current situation—where most mergers are challenged and then settled 
for a relatively small payment to attorneys—provides no effective 
deterrence at all, because the outcomes are entirely divorced from the 
merits. Thus, claim sale could function to provide deterrence where market 
discipline cannot and where legal remedies currently do not. 
B. A Market for Legal Claims in Practice: Appraisal Arbitrage 
As discussed in Part IV.C, several legal obstacles exist to a full market 
for legal claims involving mergers. A market for legal claims has, however, 
begun to emerge in a closely related context: appraisal litigation.53 An 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See id. at 1362-66. 
 51. See id. at 1363; Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 
YALE L.J. 697, 736 (2005) (“Plaintiffs will surely pay a premium, in the form of a reduction 
in the amount received, for moving the risk [of a claim] onto the purchasers of the claims. 
But in a competitive market, the premium should be equal to the burden of the risk on the 
purchaser rather than to that on the seller.”). 
 52. See Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition, supra note 47, at 1363-64 
(“Taken together, more accurate compensation and more accurate deterrence represent more 
accurate private enforcement of the substantive law where sale of claims is permitted.”). 
 53. I have examined appraisal litigation in depth in several co-written articles. See 
generally Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal 
Arbitrage]; Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Interest in Appraisal, 42 J. CORP. L. 109 
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appraisal claim allows a stockholder to dissent from a merger, refuse the 
merger consideration, and instead institute a judicial proceeding where the 
sole issue is the “fair value” of the stock.54 Moreover, appraisal claims can 
be aggregated by purchase: there is no class action mechanism available in 
appraisal, and an appraisal claim can be purchased by simply buying stock 
after a merger has been announced. These features make appraisal an 
effective, natural example of a market for merger claims.  
In the first place, the market for appraisal claims is burgeoning and offers 
a useful proof of concept that such markets are practicable. Upwards of a 
half-dozen funds are active, the largest of which reportedly raised $1 billion 
for a fund dedicated to appraisal.55 Moreover, the dynamics of this market 
can usefully be compared to the unattractive landscape of merger class 
actions, and bear out the predictions made above.56 A relatively small 
number of mergers are targeted in appraisal—typically fewer than 20% of 
appraisal-eligible deals—and the decision of an aggregator to bring a claim 
appears to be strongly related to the adequacy of the merger 
consideration.57 A relatively high proportion of appraisal cases goes to 
trial—as compared to merger class actions—and many cases have resulted 
in substantial monetary recoveries for stockholders.58 
C. Barriers to Claim Sale in Merger Class Actions 
The example of appraisal suggests that a market for merger claims is 
practicable and that it can provide at least a partial replacement for the 
absence of market discipline in the merger context. Nonetheless, appraisal 
can function as only a partial deterrent, for at least two reasons. First, 
judgments in appraisal are against the acquirer, rather than management of 
                                                                                                                 
(2016); Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 46; Korsmo 
& Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 36. 
 54. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 
(AM. BAR. ASS’N, 2007). For a fuller description of appraisal, see Korsmo & Myers, The 
Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 36, at 859-67. 
 55. See Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 46, at 
339 n.226. 
 56. To be sure, appraisal is not perfectly comparable to a fiduciary challenge to a 
merger. In particular, an appraisal claim does not formally require the stockholder to show 
managerial wrongdoing. Appraisal does, however, seek to remedy the same general problem 
as most merger class actions—inadequate consideration. See id. at 333. Moreover, in modern 
practice, showing some defect in the sales process—even if it is short of culpable 
wrongdoing—is a crucial part of most successful appraisal cases. See id. at 328. 
 57. Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 53, at 1570. 
 58. Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 46, at 282. 
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the target company, meaning any deterrence will be somewhat indirect. 
Second, because only dissenting stockholders receive any judicial award 
above the merger price, deterrence will necessarily be incomplete.59 The 
deterring effect of judicial remedies in the merger context could be 
improved by expanding the right to sell legal claims to fiduciary duty 
claims. 
At present, there are two major obstacles to aggregation by acquisition in 
merger cases. The first is the so-called “contemporaneous ownership” 
requirement, which limits the standing of stockholders to bring claims that 
arose prior to them purchasing their shares.60 This requirement artificially 
freezes the universe of potential plaintiffs at the moment of the wrongdoing, 
and would prevent a specialist aggregator from observing a merger 
announcement, carefully evaluating the merits of the potential claim, and 
then deciding whether to invest in aggregating the claims. While the 
contemporaneous ownership requirement formally applies only to 
derivative litigation,61 it comes into play in the class action context as well, 
with Delaware courts holding that after-acquirers cannot serve as lead 
plaintiff.62 Although after-acquirers can still potentially benefit from 
litigation or settlement,63 without control over the claim the benefits of 
aggregation by acquisition would be greatly reduced. The contemporaneous 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs Through Private 
Litigation in the U.S.: Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes 39-40 (Sept. 2, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6209 
&context=faculty_scholarship (describing limitations of appraisal remedy). 
 60. See Korsmo & Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition, supra note 47, at 1357-58.  
 61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 327 (2011) (requiring that a derivative stockholder allege 
that it held the stock “at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains”). 
 62. Dieter v. Prime Comput., Inc., 681 A.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also 
Brock E. Czeschin, Adequacy of Representation, in 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. 
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 
13.25 (3d ed. 2011) (citing Leighton v. Lewis, 577 A.2d 753 (Del. 1990)) (“[A] stockholder 
who purchases shares of stock after the announcement of the challenged merger should not 
be permitted to maintain a class action challenging the merger since he is not truly a member 
of the class.”).  
 63. Although precluded from service as lead plaintiff, settlement classes are commonly 
defined to include transferees. See In re Prodigy Comm. Corp. S'holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 
19113, 2002 WL 1767543 at *4 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2002) (quoting In re Triarc Cos., Class & 
Derivative Litig., 791 A.2d 872, 878-79 (Del. Ch. 2001)) (“[W]hen a claim is asserted on 
behalf of a class of stockholders challenging the fairness of the terms of a proposed 
transaction under Delaware law, the class will ordinarily consist of those persons who held 
shares as of the date the transaction was announced and their transferees, successors and 
assigns.”). 
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ownership requirement must be abolished for a merger claims market to 
flourish, and little or nothing would be lost in abolishing it.64 
The second obstacle to aggregation by acquisition in merger cases is the 
mere availability of the class action mechanism as a competing form of 
aggregation. Where procedural aggregation is available, a class action 
attorney able to get a court to certify a class will almost always face far 
lower costs than an acquirer, and will be able to nip any market for claims 
in the bud. One potential solution is to eliminate the merger class action 
entirely, given the paucity of evidence that such actions benefit 
stockholders or deter mismanagement in the merger context. Less 
ambitiously, however, courts could simply use existing procedural rules to 
ensure that the availability of procedural aggregation does not interfere with 
potential aggregation by acquisition. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3) and its state law analogs require courts certifying a class based on 
the predominance of common questions to find that “a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”65 Where aggregation by acquisition is feasible—as it 
would be in most merger cases—courts should use this provision to avoid 
certifying classes that would interfere with the workings of a market for 
merger claims. 
Without these obstacles to aggregation by acquisition, the right to sell 
legal claims promises to generate real constraints on managerial 
wrongdoing where they otherwise would not exist. 
Conclusion 
In the ordinary course of business, the ability of stockholders in public 
companies to simply sell their shares places powerful constraints on 
mismanagement. If a company’s managers are disloyal, or simply fail to 
manage the company well, the company’s falling stock price will place the 
firm at a competitive disadvantage and expose management to the prospect 
of being replaced in a takeover. Legal remedies are of decidedly secondary 
importance in this context. The rise of institutional shareholding does not 
                                                                                                                 
 64. For a comprehensive argument against the contemporaneous ownership 
requirement, see J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership 
Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (arguing that the rule is “fundamentally 
incoherent,” that it “operates largely at random,” and that it “arbitrarily mandates the 
dismissal of potentially meritorious claims”). See also Macey & Miller, supra note 37, at 
892-94 (“The rationale for the contemporaneous ownership rule . . . appears questionable at 
best.”); Korsmo & Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation, supra note 36, at 892-94. 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 23(b)(3). 
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threaten the powerful protections created by stockholders’ ability to “exit” 
by selling their shares.  
“Exit” can serve as little protection, however, in the context of a merger, 
where the terms of that exit are unavoidably set by the merger agreement. It 
is too late to sell after a merger has already been announced. If 
mismanagement is to be deterred, the deterrence must instead come largely 
from legal remedies like fiduciary duty class actions. These legal remedies 
have historically been ineffective, at least partly due to the pervasive 
agency problems between plaintiffs and class counsel. Supplementing the 
right to sell stock with the right to sell legal claims, however, promises to 
imbue legal remedies with real deterrence value in the merger context, 
precisely where it is most needed. 
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